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HILLENMEYER, “CONVENIENCE OF THE
EMPLOYER,” AND THE TAXATION OF
NONRESIDENTS’ INCOMES
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY
ABSTRACT
In Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Board of Review, Ohio’s Supreme Court
unanimously declared that Cleveland’s municipal income tax violated the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution by taxing a nonresident athlete
under the “games-played” method rather than the “duty-days” method. According to
the Ohio court, the games-played approach overtaxed Mr. Hillenmeyer by allocating
to Cleveland Mr. Hillenmeyer’s compensation from the Chicago Bears using the
percentage of the Bears’ games played in Cleveland. By this approach, Cleveland
taxed Mr. Hillenmeyer extraterritorially, reaching income he earned from services he
performed for the Bears outside of Cleveland’s borders. Due process, the Ohio court
concluded, requires Cleveland to avoid such extraterritorial taxation by allocating
income based on all of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s days worked for the Bears including days
devoted to practice sessions and promotional activity.
The Supreme Court of the Buckeye State correctly construed the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and thereby created a conflict with the interpretation
of that clause advanced by New York’s highest tribunal, the Court of Appeals, in its
Zelinsky and Huckaby decisions. As a matter of constitutional law and tax policy, a
nonresident’s income should be taxed in the state and city where it is earned. The
Hillenmeyer court got this principle right. New York’s courts did not.
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INTRODUCTION
In Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Board of Review, the Supreme Court of Ohio
unanimously declared that Cleveland’s municipal income tax violated the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution by taxing a nonresident athlete under the
“games-played” method rather than the “duty-days” method.1 According to the Ohio
Supreme Court, the games-played approach overtaxed Mr. Hillenmeyer by allocating


Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of
Yeshiva University.
1 41 N.E.3d 1164, 1177 (Ohio), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 491 (2015).
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to Cleveland Mr. Hillenmeyer’s compensation from the Chicago Bears using the
percentage of the Bears’ games played in Cleveland. By this approach, Cleveland
taxed Mr. Hillenmeyer extraterritorially, reaching income he earned from services he
performed for the Bears outside of Cleveland’s borders. Due process, the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded, required Cleveland to avoid such extraterritorial taxation
by allocating income based on all of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s days worked for the Bears
including days devoted to practice sessions and promotional activity.
At one level, Hillenmeyer is the most recent episode in the evolution of “jock
taxation,” i.e., the efforts of cities and states to enforce their income taxes against
nonresident athletes (and entertainers) performing within their respective borders.2
However, the implications of Hillenmeyer extend beyond such “jock taxation.” The
Supreme Court of the Buckeye State correctly construed the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and thereby created a conflict with the interpretation of that
clause advanced by New York’s highest tribunal, the Court of Appeals, in its
Zelinsky3 and Huckaby4 decisions.
Holding for Mr. Hillenmeyer, the Ohio Supreme Court understood due process as
requiring that, for income tax purposes, a nonresident employee’s “compensation
must be allocated to the place where the employee performed the work.”5 In contrast,
under New York’s so-called “convenience of the employer” rule, New York’s
highest court allows New York to tax extraterritorially, reaching income earned on
days when nonresidents work at their out-of-state homes and never set foot in the
Empire State.
Hillenmeyer properly implements the due process case law of the United States
Supreme Court barring extraterritorial taxation. Hillenmeyer also reaches better
results as a matter of tax policy. In contrast, New York’s employer convenience rule
often creates double state income taxation by projecting the Empire State’s taxing
authority beyond New York’s boundaries to tax nonresidents on income they earn at
their out-of-state homes.
In an appropriate case, the United States Supreme Court could resolve the tension
between these conflicting approaches to the state taxation of nonresident incomes.
Alternatively, Congress should enact legislation to confirm the Hillenmeyer
approach and thereby eliminate the double taxation caused by New York’s
extraterritorial taxation of nonresidents’ incomes when such nonresidents work
outside New York’s boundaries.

2 See, e.g., Robert Willens, Cleveland’s “Games Played” Method of Allocation Rejected,
87 DAILY TAX REP. J. 1 (2015); Kirk Berger, Note, Foul Play: Tennessee’s Unequal
Application of its Jock Tax Against Professional Athletes, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 333, 336 (2014); Jennifer Carr, Former NFL Players Have Strong Claims in
Cleveland Income Allocation Dispute, 73 ST. TAX TODAY, Jul. 29, 2014, at 4-5; Steven
Pahuskin, Heads Up! Recent Federal and State Attempts to Address Nonresident Income
Taxation Perpetuate Selective Enforcement and Unfairness of the “Jock Tax,” 64 TAX LAW
961, 970-71 (2011).
3

Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003).

4

Huckaby v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 829 N.E.2d 276 (N.Y. 2005).

5

Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 1176.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/9

2

2016] HILLENMEYER AND THE TAXATION OF NONRESIDENTS’ INCOME 305
As a matter of constitutional law and tax policy, a nonresident’s income should
be taxed in the state and city where it is earned.6 The Hillenmeyer court got this
principle right. New York’s courts did not.
I. THE HILLENMEYER DECISION
Hunter T. Hillenmeyer was a linebacker for the Chicago Bears.7 In 2004, 2005,
and 2006, Mr. Hillenmeyer worked in Cleveland for two days in each year.8 Each
year, the Bears played approximately twenty games, one of which was played in
Cleveland.9 Each year, the Bears practiced in Cleveland on a Saturday, played a
game on the immediately following Sunday, and departed for home after the game.10
Hence, Mr. Hillenmeyer worked each year in Cleveland for two days, one day of
practice, one day for the actual game.
Using the “games-played” method, Cleveland imposed its nonresident municipal
income tax against 1/20 of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s salary from the Bears.11 Under this
method, Cleveland each year divided the total number of games the Bears played in
Cleveland (1) by the total number of “pre-season and regular-season games” played
by the Bears (20).12 Cleveland then multiplied the resulting fraction (1/20) against
Mr. Hillenmeyer’s salary from the Bears. Cleveland thereby allocated to itself and
taxed five percent of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s salary on the theory that five percent of the
Bears’ games occurred in Cleveland.13
In contrast is the “duty-days” method of allocating nonresident athletes’ incomes
to the various states and communities in which they work. Under the duty-days
method, the numerator of the fraction is the number of days the nonresident athlete
works each year in the taxing jurisdiction.14 For Mr. Hillenmeyer, this number was
two, representing the two days each year he spent with the Bears in Cleveland.15 The
denominator of the fraction is the total number of the athlete’s work days including
all game, practice, promotional, and training days.16 In Mr. Hillenmeyer’s case, this
6

“[A] fundamental, underlying principle of income taxation [is] that income should be
taxed where it is earned . . . .” Maria Koklanaris, U.S. House Members Introduce 2015
Version of Mobile Workforce Bill, 76 ST. TAX NOTES 500 (2015) (quoting Patrick Carter,
director of the Delaware Division of Revenue and spokesperson for the Federation of Tax
Administrators). Ironically, notwithstanding Mr. Carter’s comments, Delaware employs the
“convenience of the employer” doctrine to tax nonresident employees on days they work
outside Delaware. See Flynn v. Dir. of Revenue, RIA SLT DE 1504 (Del. Tax Appeals Bd.
Sept. 14, 2011).
7

Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 1167.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 1169.

11

Id. at 1167-68.

12

Id. at 1170-71.

13

Id. at 1171.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.
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number was on the order of 157, representing not just game days but all duty days
Mr. Hillenmeyer worked for the Bears.17 These duty days for the Bears included
days devoted to “training, practices, strategy sessions, and promotional activities.”18
The resulting fraction (2/157) allocates a much smaller percentage (1.27%)19 of Mr.
Hillenmeyer’s salary to Cleveland on the theory that the proper way to measure Mr.
Hillenmeyer’s salary earned in, and allocable to, Cleveland is by looking at all of the
“duty days” on which Mr. Hillenmeyer worked for the Bears. In any year, only two
of these duty days occurred in Cleveland.20
When Cleveland insisted on the games-played, rather than the duty-days, method
for allocating to Cleveland a portion of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s salary from the Bears, Mr.
Hillenmeyer objected, asserting both state law and constitutional claims. Among his
constitutional claims, Mr. Hillenmeyer contended that, under the dormant Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Cleveland overtaxed Mr. Hillenmeyer under the
games-played method by failing to apportion his income properly between
Cleveland and the other locations in which Mr. Hillenmeyer performed services for
the Bears.21 Mr. Hillenmeyer also maintained that the games-played method,
violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution by taxing him
extraterritorially, allocating to Cleveland compensation he earned from the Bears
outside of Cleveland.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Cleveland’s use of the games-played method,
while justified under Ohio law, violated the requirements of the Due Process Clause:
Cleveland’s power to tax reaches only that portion of a nonresident’s
compensation that was earned by work performed in Cleveland. The
games-played method reaches income for work that was performed
outside of Cleveland, and thus Cleveland’s income tax violates due
process as applied to NFL players such as Hillenmeyer.22
Central to the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis was the U.S. Supreme Court’s
seminal statement of state taxing authority in Shaffer v. Carter.23 Per Shaffer, a state
may only tax a nonresident’s income that “actually arises” in the state.24 Under this
principle, the Ohio court declared, “local taxation of a nonresident’s compensation
for services must be based on the location of the taxpayer when the services were
performed.”25 Accordingly, for state and local income tax purposes, a nonresident’s
17

Id. This was the total number of “duty days” Mr. Hillenmeyer worked for the Bears in
2004. The equivalent number of duty days was 165 in 2005 and 168 in 2006. Id.
18

Id. at 1168.

19

Id. at 1171 (this was the percentage for 2004). For 2005, the equivalent percentage
under the “duty days” method was 1.21%, while for 2006 the equivalent percentage was
1.19%. Id.
20

Id.

21

Id. at 1167-68.

22

Id. at 1176.

23

252 U.S. 37 (1920).

24

Id. at 55.

25

Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 1175.
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“compensation must be allocated to the place where the employee performed the
work.”26
The games-played method allocated five percent of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s
compensation to Cleveland when he actually only worked in Cleveland for
“approximately 1.25 percent” of his duty days for the Bears.27 As the court in
Hillenmeyer stated, “[b]y using the games-played method, Cleveland has reached
extraterritorially, beyond its power to tax.”28 “Due Process requires” that Cleveland
use for income tax purposes “an allocation that reasonably associates the amount of
compensation taxed with work the taxpayer performed within the city.”29
Buttressing the Hillenmeyer court’s due process analysis is Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,30 in particular, Moorman’s observation that due process
requires that to avoid extraterritorial taxation, “the income attributed to the State for
tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing State.’”31
The Ohio court summarized its due process analysis:
Cleveland’s games-played method imposes an extraterritorial tax in
violation of due process, because it foreseeably imposes Cleveland
income tax on compensation earned while Hillenmeyer was working
outside Cleveland. Consistent with the rule that the taxing authority may
not collect tax on a nonresident’s compensation earned outside its
jurisdiction, the duty-days method properly includes as taxable income
only that compensation earned in Cleveland by accounting for all the
work for which an NFL player such as Hillenmeyer is paid, rather than
merely the football games he plays each year. This method therefore
comports with due process and ensures that the tax collected is not
disproportionate to the income received for work in Cleveland.32
Because the Ohio court ruled for Mr. Hillenmeyer on due process grounds, it did not
address Mr. Hillenmeyer’s dormant Commerce Clause claim.33
II. NEW YORK’S “CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER” RULE
New York nominally allocates nonresidents’ income on the equivalent of the
“duty days” method. Specifically, in any year New York taxes a nonresident’s salary
on the basis of a fraction consisting of the days the nonresident works in New York
state for his employer divided by the nonresident’s total days worked for his
employer in all locations.34 However, a controversial35 exception effectively
26

Id. at 1176.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

437 U.S. 267 (1978).

31

Id. at 273 (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U.S. 317, 325
(1968)).
32

Hillenmeyer, 41 N.E.3d at 1176-77.

33

Id.

34

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. REGS. 20, § 132.18(a) (2015).
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swallows this rule: New York maintains that a day worked outside the Empire State
will nevertheless be treated as an in-state day for income tax purposes unless the
nonresident works out-of-state that day out “of necessity, as distinguished from
convenience.”36 In practice, this so-called “convenience of the employer”37 test
produces the same result as Cleveland’s “games-played” method by allocating
nonresidents’ incomes to New York even if such income is earned on a day wholly
worked outside New York’s boundaries.
Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal involved a law professor38 who lives in New
Haven, Connecticut, and teaches in Manhattan at Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law.39 In stipulations agreed to by this nonresident professor and
the New York Department of Taxation and Finance,40 New York acknowledged that,
in the years in question, the professor taught in and commuted to Manhattan eightyfour days each year “mainly to teach classes and meet with students.”41 The
Department also stipulated that the professor otherwise worked at his Connecticut
home “grading examinations, writing recommendations for students, and conducting
scholarly research and writing.”42 Since a majority of the professor’s work days for

35

See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein & John A. Swain, Income Taxation of Nonresidents, STATE
TAXATION ¶ 20.05[4][e][i] (3d ed. 2015), 1999 WL 1399044 [hereinafter Hellerstein &
Swain]; WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE & LOCAL TAXATION: CASES & MATERIALS 391402 (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN ET AL.]; Nicole Belson Goluboff, Back in
Business With The Multi-State Worker Tax Fairness Act, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 101, 102 (2014)
[hereinafter Belson Goluboff, Tax Fairness Act]; Nicole Belson Goluboff, State Tax Reform:
The Modern Solution To Keep Workers Mobile and Businesses Resilient, TAX MGMT. WKLY
ST. TAX RPT. 1, 1-3 (2014); Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in Our
National Economy, 8 FLA. TAX. REV. 885, 922 (2008); William V. Vetter, New York’s
Convenience of the Employer Rule Conveniently Collects Cash From Nonresidents (pt. 2), 42
ST. TAX NOTES 229, 238 (2006). For my most recent comments on New York’s employer
convenience rule, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Combining the Mobile Workforce and the
Telecommuter Tax Acts, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 319 (2012).
36

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2015).

37 The term “convenience of the employer” does not actually appear in the regulation
though this is how the courts and commentators have come to refer to New York’s taxation of
nonresidents on days they work outside the Empire State. See, e.g., Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2003) (referring to the “convenience of the employer”
rule).
38

I.e., me.

39

Id. at 843-44.

40

These stipulations were accepted in toto by the administrative law judge as his findings
of fact. In turn, the Tax Appeals Tribunal accepted these stipulation-based findings of fact as
found by the administrative law judge. In re Zelinsky, DTA No. 817065, 2001 WL 1512096,
at *1-*2.
41

Zelinksy, 801 N.E.2d at 843-44.

42

Id. at 844. Professor Vetter and Professor Hellerstein both criticize the Court of
Appeals for ignoring the factual stipulations agreed to by Professor Zelinsky and the
Department. See William V. Vetter, New York’s Convenience of the Employer Rule
Conveniently Collects Cash From Nonresidents (pt. 1), 42 ST. TAX NOTES 173 (2006)
(“clearly inconsistent with the stipulations and ALJ findings”); Hellerstein & Swain, supra
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his law school employer occurred at his out-of-state home, the resulting fraction
allocated to New York was less than half of his salary from Cardozo.
However, under the rubric of New York’s convenience of the employer rule, the
Department taxed all of Professor Zelinsky’s salary even though he spent a majority
of his working days at home in Connecticut, engaging in legal writing and other
professorial activities.43
In the face of constitutional claims similar to those advanced by Mr.
Hillenmeyer, New York’s Court of Appeals sustained New York’s taxation of all of
Professor Zelinsky’s salary, even though he spent a majority of his working days
outside the Empire State, engaged in legal scholarship and other professorial duties
at his Connecticut home. The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the claim that
the due process prohibition on extraterritorial taxation limited New York to taxing
the portion of Professor Zelinsky’s law school salary actually earned on the
professor’s days teaching in New York: “[A]n ample foundation to justify the tax is
provided by the host of tangible and intangible benefits flowing directly and
indirectly to petitioner from New York, the location of the law school that supplies
his total relevant income.”44
The New York court never explained how the benefits New York provides to the
professor’s New York employer, the Cardozo School of Law, overcome the due
process requirement that New York only tax the income earned by Professor
Zelinsky within New York’s borders.
The Court of Appeals decided Zelinsky against the taxpayer by a 6-0 vote. On its
second confrontation with the constitutionality of the employer convenience
doctrine, two members of the New York court developed reservations about the
constitutionality of the “convenience of the employer” rule. However, in Huckaby v.
N.Y. State Division of Tax Appeals, a bare majority of the court’s seven judges still
sustained the rule against constitutional challenge.45
Thomas L. Huckaby was a Tennessee resident and a computer programmer who
worked for a New York company.46 Mr. Huckaby “spent roughly 25% of his
workdays in New York and 75% of his workdays in Tennessee” at his home office
in the Volunteer State.47 When New York taxed all of Mr. Huckaby’s salary, he
raised both dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process challenges. Citing its due
process discussion in Zelinsky, the Huckaby court reiterated the “‘host of tangible
and intangible protections, benefits and values’ New York provided to the taxpayer
and his employer”48 and cited these as overcoming Mr. Huckaby’s due process claim
to be free of New York state income tax on the days he worked for his employer at
his home in Nashville.49
note 35 (“The court chose to ignore the fact that teaching constituted only a portion of
Zelinsky’s duties . . . .”).
43

Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 840-41.

44

Id. at 48-49.

45

829 N.E.2d 276, 277 (N.Y. 2005).

46

Id. at 277-78.

47

Id. at 278.

48

Id. at 283 (quoting Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 848).

49

Id. at 279.
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Judge Robert Smith (who joined the New York Court of Appeals after Zelinsky)
dissented in Huckaby,50 supported by Judges George B. Smith and Carmen Ciparick
(who had been part of the six-judge majority that ruled against Professor Zelinsky).51
In due process terms, Judge Smith stated, “the tax in this case—applied to 100% of
Huckaby’s income—is out of all proportion to the time he spent working in New
York—25%.”52 It is a “novel due process theory”53 that “permits a state to tax
income earned out of state by nonresident employees of local employers . . . .”54
Like “jock taxation,” New York’s convenience of the employer rule has been
subject of extensive and overwhelmingly negative commentary.55 However, as of
today, New York persists in taxing nonresidents’ incomes earned on days such
nonresidents work for their employers at their out-of-state homes and do not set foot
in the Empire State.
III. DISCUSSION
Hillenmeyer faithfully implements the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process case
law. Zelinsky and Huckaby do not. A central theme of the U.S. Supreme Court’s due
process case law is that states must avoid extraterritorial taxation and thus may only
tax values that arise within their respective borders: “The Due Process and
Commerce Clauses forbid the States to tax ‘extraterritorial values.’”56
It is hard to imagine taxation more extraterritorial in nature than New York’s
taxation of the income earned by Mr. Huckaby in Tennessee or by Professor
Zelinsky in Connecticut. This was the point grasped by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Hillenmeyer, namely, as a matter of due process, Cleveland cannot tax Mr.
Hillenmeyer on the income he earned from the Bears on services performed outside
Ohio. “[L]ocal taxation of a nonresident’s compensation for services must be based
on the location of the taxpayer when the services were performed.”57
Besides being correct as a matter of constitutional law, the result in Hillenmeyer
is also better as a matter of tax policy. New York’s “convenience of the employer”
rule typically causes double state income taxation of compensation earned by
nonresidents on days they work at their homes outside the borders of the Empire
State.

50

Id. at 285.

51

Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003).

52

Huckaby, 829 N.E.2d at 290 (Smith, J., dissenting).

53

Id. at 291.

54

Id.

55

See Berger, supra note 2.

56 MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 19 (2008) (quoting
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983)); see also Edward
A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2008).
57 Hillenmeyer v. Cleveland Bd. of Rev., 41 N.E.3d 1164, 1175 (Ohio), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 491 (2015).
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A majority of states which impose income taxes on their residents provide no
offsetting credit for the income taxes New York (or any other state)58 levies under
the employer convenience rule since this income arises in the state where the
resident works at home, not in New York. These states of residence are correct to
withhold a credit against their respective income taxes when New York, via the
employer convenience rule, taxes income earned outside its boundaries. On the days
one of their residents works from home, these states of residence (not New York)
provide public services to the resident working at home. Under these circumstances,
a credit by the resident state for the income taxes improperly imposed by New York
cedes to New York the primary authority to tax – even though, on this work-at-home
day, it is the state of residence (not New York) which provides public services to the
resident laboring at home.
Consider, for example, a day when Professor Zelinsky researches, writes, and
grades exams at home in Connecticut. When he turns on the faucet, the water is
provided by the Greater New Haven Water Pollution Control Authority. The
policeman who patrols in front of Professor Zelinsky’s Connecticut house on this
work-at-home day is an employee of a Connecticut municipality. If Professor
Zelinsky requires EMT services on a day he writes, researches, or grades at his
house, the EMT will be also be an employee of a Connecticut municipality.
Thus, on a day when Professor Zelinsky works at home, any services New York
provides to him are at best tangential compared to the services provided by
Connecticut and its municipalities. In light of the benefits it provides to its residents
on the days they labor at home, Connecticut, like most of its sister states, correctly
views its authority to tax income on this day as primary. Connecticut (like most
other states imposing an income tax) thus does not furnish a credit, which would
cede the authority to tax on such day to New York.59
The result is double state income taxation as, on such a day, Connecticut (the
state where Professor Zelinsky lives, works and receives public services) properly
imposes its income tax on him. Simultaneously, New York imposes a second tax
even though, on this work-at-home day, Professor Zelinsky does not leave
Connecticut or enter New York. Since neither state gives a credit for the income tax
levied by the other, the upshot is double state taxation of the income Professor
Zelinsky earns in Connecticut.

58 While New York has been the most aggressive state in applying the “convenience of
the employer” rule, the other states embracing some version of the rule are Delaware,
Pennsylvania and Nebraska. See Flynn v. Dir. of Revenue, RIA SLT DE 1504 (Del. Tax
Appeals Bd. Sept. 14, 2011); see also 316 NEB. ADMIN. CODE. § 22-003.01(C)(1) (2015); 61
PA. CODE § 109.8 (2015).
59

Connecticut, like most states which impose a personal income tax, only grants an
income tax credit for taxes paid to another state “derived from sources” within that other state.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-704(a)(1) (West 2015). Since New York’s employer
convenience doctrine taxes income earned outside New York’s borders, there is no credit
under this or any similar standard which grants a credit only if another state taxes income
which is earned within that other state. For a discussion of state income tax credits for taxes
paid to another state, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to
Eliminate the Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed
Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533, 546-48 (2014).
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A minority of states do give a credit against their income taxes when New York
(or another state) taxes under the employer convenience rule.60 This credit avoids
double taxation for the individual working at home, but causes the resident state’s
treasury to subsidize New York on a day when the resident state provides public
services to its resident working at home.
Consider, for example, Professor Zelinsky’s Cardozo colleague who works a day
from her home in New Jersey, writing, researching, and grading. On such a day
worked at home, the Garden State and its municipalities provide the public services
protecting this professor. New Jersey is one of the minority states that credits against
its income tax the New York taxes attributable to this day.61
This New Jersey credit avoids double taxation for its resident, though she still
pays the higher New York rate on the salary she earns at home in New Jersey.62
Moreover, this New Jersey credit depletes New Jersey’s treasury even though, on
this work-at-home day, New Jersey and its localities provide the public services to
the law professor working at her home in the Garden State. As a matter of tax policy,
this result (like double state income taxation of the same income) is unsound as the
state of residence, New Jersey in this example, obtains no taxes from its resident
working at home—even though New Jersey and its localities, not New York, provide
services on that day to the resident working at home.
In contrast to the outcomes in Zelinsky and Huckaby, Hillenmeyer reaches the
right result as a matter of tax policy: Mr. Hillenmeyer only pays municipal income
taxes to Cleveland for the two days each year he actually spent in Cleveland for the
Bears—the two days on which he received Cleveland’s public services.
Moorman suggests that, in taxing the salaries of nonresident athletes, Cleveland
could weigh game days more heavily than practice and promotional days on the
theory that game days are more important to the production of Mr. Hillenmeyer’s
salary from the Bears.63 In Moorman, the Supreme Court upheld an Iowa income
apportionment formula, which assigned to the Hawkeye State the same percentage of
a corporate taxpayer’s total income as the percentage of the taxpayer’s total sales,
which occurred in Iowa.64 The Iowa apportionment formula disregarded the minimal
percentage of the taxpayer’s property and payroll located in the Hawkeye State. In
sustaining Iowa’s sales-only apportionment formula, the Moorman Court observed
that:
[T]he basic principles [concerning apportionment formulas are] that the
States have wide latitude in the election of apportionment formulas and
that a formula-produced assessment will only be disturbed when the
60

Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 2003).

61

Unlike Connecticut or the majority of other states imposing a tax on personal incomes,
New Jersey grants a credit for “any income tax” imposed by another state, even if that tax is
imposed on income not attributable to that other state. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:4-1(a) (West
2015).
62 New Jersey, like most states, limits its credit to the taxes New Jersey assesses. Id.
Consequently, there is no New Jersey credit to the extent the New York income tax imposes a
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Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978).
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taxpayer has proved by clear and cogent evidence that the income
attributed to the State is in fact out of all appropriate proportion to the
business transacted . . . in that State or has led to a grossly distorted
result.65
In the wake of Moorman, many states reconfigured their respective formulas for
apportioning corporate income. One common post-Moorman approach is to
apportion income on the basis of an average of the percentages of a corporation’s
sales, property, and payroll in the taxing state, but to double count the fraction
reflecting the percentage of the taxpayer’s sales in the taxing state.66 In a similar
fashion, Cleveland could plausibly conclude that game days are the most important
days on an athlete’s schedule and thus double count these days.
But Cleveland cannot do what it did to Mr. Hillenmeyer, namely, ignore
completely the nongame days on which a nonresident athlete provides practice and
promotional services for the team employing him. That, as the Hillenmeyer court
recognized, produces a “grossly distorted result”67 in violation of the Due Process
Clause’s prohibition on extraterritorial income taxation.
IV. REMEDIES
Ideally, the U.S. Supreme Court could have heard Hillenmeyer and confirmed
that decision’s application of the Due Process Clause. Alternatively, Congress, using
its authority under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, could confirm the
Hillenmeyer result legislatively.
Legislation to overturn Zelinsky and Huckaby has regularly been introduced in
Congress since those decisions were handed down by the New York Court of
Appeals. In its most recent incarnation, this legislation was introduced in Congress
as the Multi-State Worker Tax Fairness Act of 2014.68 If enacted into law, this Act
would confirm Hillenmeyer on a nationwide basis by providing that a state may
impose income tax on a nonresident’s compensation “for any period of time only if
such nonresident individual is physically present in such State for such period.”69
The Act would further clarify that a “State may not impose nonresident income taxes
on such compensation with respect to any period of time when such nonresident
individual is physically present in another State.”70 Moreover, the Act would
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Id. (internal quotation marks and citations deleted) (ellipsis in original).
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See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 501; see also, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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explicitly bar any state from utilizing “any convenience of the employer test or any
similar test.”71
Thus, if enacted into law, the Multi-State Worker Tax Fairness Act would
implement nationwide the due process principle, exemplified by Hillenmeyer, that
states may not tax nonresidents extraterritorially on compensation such nonresidents
earn on days worked outside the taxing state.
CONCLUSION
Both as a matter of constitutional law and tax policy, a nonresident’s income
should be taxed in the state and city where it is earned. The Hillenmeyer court got
this principle right. The Zelinsky and Huckaby courts did not.
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